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Abstract
Learning would be a convincing method to achieve coordination on an equilibrium. But
does learning converge, and to what? We answer this question in generic 2-player, 2-strategy
games, using Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA), which encompasses many extensively
studied learning algorithms. We exhaustively characterize the parameter space of EWA
learning, for any payoff matrix, and we understand the generic properties that imply con-
vergent or non-convergent behaviour in 2× 2 games.
Irrational choice and lack of incentives imply convergence to a mixed strategy in the cen-
tre of the strategy simplex, possibly far from the Nash Equilibrium (NE). In the opposite
limit, in which the players quickly modify their strategies, the behaviour depends on the pay-
off matrix: (i) a strong discrepancy between the pure strategies describes dominance-solvable
games, which show convergence to a unique fixed point close to the NE; (ii) a preference
towards profiles of strategies along the main diagonal describes coordination games, with
multiple stable fixed points corresponding to the NE; (iii) a cycle of best responses defines
discoordination games, which commonly yield limit cycles or low-dimensional chaos.
While it is well known that mixed strategy equilibria may be unstable, our approach
is novel from several perspectives: we fully analyse EWA and provide explicit thresholds
that define the onset of instability; we find an emerging taxonomy of the learning dynamics,
without focusing on specific classes of games ex-ante; we show that chaos can occur even
in the simplest games; we make a precise theoretical prediction that can be tested against
data on experimental learning of discoordination games.
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Chaos.
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1 Introduction
How do players coordinate on specific profiles of strategies in non-cooperative games, and
why should they coordinate on an equilibrium profile? If the game is simple or one-shot, a
reasonable explanation is provided by strategic thinking and introspection. Another justi-
fication, which is more generally valid in complicated and repeated games, is learning and
interaction. However, as it is fairly well known since the contribution of Shapley (1964),
the learning dynamics may fail to converge to an equilibrium. This questions the validity of
equilibrium thinking in game theory: at least in some contexts, strategic interactions might
be governed by learning in an ever-changing environment, rather than by rational and fully-
informed decision making. The literature has faced the dilemma about the convergence of
the learning dynamics to Nash Equilibria (NE) in several ways. Most theoretical work has
identified classes of games and learning algorithms in which the dynamics succeeds to con-
verge; some authors provided counter-examples in which learning would not converge.1 Little
has been said about the generic properties of games and learning algorithms which yield a
convergent or non-convergent dynamics. Recent work (Galla and Farmer, 2013) addressed
this issue by considering ensembles of 2-person, N -strategy games and finding the regions of
the parameter space where learning was less likely to converge: negatively correlated pay-
offs and “rational” long-memory learning implied limit cycles and high-dimensional chaos
in the learning dynamics. However, little understanding of the reasons for non-convergent
behaviour was provided.
In order to shed light on the mechanisms behind (non-)convergence, this paper inves-
tigates the drivers of instability in the simplest possible non-trivial setting, that is generic
2-person, 2-strategy normal form games, trying to capture the typical features of the payoff
matrix and of the learning behaviour that yield a cycling or an irregular dynamics. We
study a slightly simplified version of Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA), which is gen-
eral enough to encompass both reinforcement and belief learning and has been shown to
be in accord with experimental data (Camerer and Ho, 1999). In short, we find that the
existence of a cycle of best responses in the payoff matrix,2 coupled with a quick enough
learning dynamics (in a sense that will be specified later), is a sufficient condition for the
non-convergence of learning. In particular, in games with a unique mixed strategy equilib-
rium (to which we refer as discoordination games, lacking an established terminology in the
literature) the players follow the cycle of best responses and never converge to the NE: we
rather observe limit cycles or low-dimensional chaos. Lack of convergence is driven by the
players adapting too quickly to the moves of their opponent. In the same learning scenario,
if the payoff matrix is acyclic (there is at least one fixed point in terms of best responses,
that is a profile of strategies which is the best response by both players to some beliefs on
their opponent), as in dominance-solvable and coordination games, convergence to a pure
strategy NE occurs immediately. On the contrary, if the players are “irrational” and/or do
not have enough incentives to switch their moves, they do not recognize that a pure strat-
egy may be better and simply randomize between their possible moves, reaching a mixed
strategy fixed point.
We find such a taxonomy of the learning dynamics by looking at relevant combinations
of parameters, which naturally emerge from the mathematical analysis. Figure 1 illustrates
our approach and provides a qualitative characterization of the parameter space. We denote
by “irrationality” the ratio of two parameters of EWA, namely the memory loss of past
performance α divided by the closeness to optimal decision making β (payoff sensitivity or
intensity of choice). “Coordination” (AC) depends on the payoff matrix and quantifies the
preference of the players for “diagonal” outcomes: if we denote their pure strategies by 1
1Robinson (1951); Miyazawa (1961); Shapley (1964); Crawford (1974); Stahl (1988); Nachbar (1990); Milgrom
and Roberts (1991); Krishna (1992); Conlisk (1993a); Monderer and Shapley (1996); Hahn (1999); Arieli and
Young (2016).
2For instance, in Matching Pennies, if player Row (who wins if the pennies are matched) thinks that player
Column would play Heads, the best response for Row would be to play Heads. The best response for Column to
this move of player Row is to play Tails. Row would then switch to Tails as well, and so on.
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Dominance solvable
games
(Anti) Coordination gamesDiscoordination games β
α AC
β
αBD Multiple fixed points
Unique pure fixed point
Unique mixed fixed point
Limit cycles and chaos
(
4,−3 0, 0
0, 0 3,−4
) (
4, 4 0, 0
0, 0 3, 3
)
(
0, 0 4, 3
3, 4 0, 0
)
(
3, 3 0, 0
0, 0 −4,−4
)
Figure 1: Qualitative characterization of the parameter space. The irrationality α/β refers
to the intrinsic noise in the learning algorithm. Coordination (AC) and dominance (|BD|)
quantify properties of the payoff matrix. The combinations of these parameters characterize
the learning dynamics and relate to specific classes of 2× 2 games.
and 2, coordination is large when the payoffs associated with the profiles of strategies (1, 1)
and (2, 2) are much larger than the payoffs for (1, 2) and (2, 1).3 “Dominance” (|BD|) on
the other hand quantifies the relative strength of a pure strategy with respect to the other
one. Coordination and dominance naturally relate to well-known classes of 2× 2 games (see
Table 1 and Section 2). Dominance is large for dominance-solvable games; coordination is
positive and large for coordination and anticoordination games, whereas it is negative and
large for discoordination games.
The learning behaviours in the taxonomy are quite intuitive and not particularly novel.
The main contribution of this work lies in its methodology, namely in the exhaustive char-
acterization of the space of games which makes it possible to identify specific structures in
the payoff matrix and various classes of games in an “unsupervised” way, to borrow the
terminology from machine learning. Further details on the relations of this work with the
existing literature are provided below.
Related literature The first example of a normal form game where convergence of fic-
titious play (Brown, 1951; Robinson, 1951) did not occur was provided by Shapley (1964).
He considered a 3× 3 payoff matrix similar to the one in Rock-Paper-Scissors, and showed
that fictitious play would spiral out of the mixed strategy NE, by following cycles of expo-
nentially increasing period. Crawford (1974) considered another adaptive learning algorithm
(related to gradient learning), which was not able to reach mixed strategy NE, but Con-
lisk (1993a,b) showed how some amendments to Crawford’s adaptive dynamics lead instead
to convergence. From the point of view of the properties of the payoff matrix, Nachbar
(1990) showed convergence to Nash Equilibria in dominance-solvable games, Monderer and
Shapley (1996) proved convergence for potential games, Milgrom and Roberts (1991) con-
sidered games with strategic complementarities (or supermodular games) and demonstrated
that learning algorithms consistent with adaptive learning would converge to the serially
undominated set of pure strategies. Arieli and Young (2016) studied stochastic better-reply
dynamics in weakly acyclic games, which encompass all classes of games considered above,
and showed that it is possible to put bounds on the speed of convergence.
3Or viceversa: coordination is also large if the payoffs for (1, 2) and (2, 1) are much larger than the payoffs for
(1, 1) and (2, 2).
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Type of game Payoff matrix:
(
a, e b, g
c, f d, h
)
Example Parameters
Coordination
a > c, b < d, e > g, f < h.
Two pure strategy (1, 1); (2, 2)
and one mixed strategy NE.
(
5, 2 −1, 1
0,−3 3, 4
)
AC = 72
|BD| = 6
Anticoordination
a < c, b > d, e < g, f > h.
Two pure strategy (1, 2); (2, 1)
and one mixed strategy NE.
(
1, 0 5, 4
2, 3 4, 1
)
AC = 12
|BD| = 0
Discoordination
a > c, e < g, b < d, f > h;
a < c, e > g, b > d, f < h.
Unique mixed strategy NE.
(
4,−3 −1,−2
−3, 2 3,−5
)
AC = −88
|BD| = 18
Dominance-
solvable
All other possible orderings.
E.g. a > c, b > d, e > g, f > h.
Unique pure strategy NE.
(
5, 3 −1, 2
0,−1 −2,−3
)
AC = 4
|BD| = 18
Table 1: Games in the taxonomy. The games are defined in terms of the orderings in the payoff
matrix. Coordination is AC, where A = a+ d− b− c and C = e+ h− f − g, while dominance
is |BD|, B = a + b − c − d, D = e + f − g − h. In dominance-solvable games, |BD| > |AC|;
in coordination and anticoordination games, |BD| < |AC|, AC > 0; in discoordination games,
|BD| < |AC|, AC < 0. Note that there are some exceptions: see Proposition 1.
Another literature focused on the generic properties of the payoff matrices and learning
algorithms that were associated with multiplicity of NE or non-convergent behaviour. Berg
and Weigt (1999) showed how the number of NE increases exponentially with the correlation
of the payoffs, while Opper and Diederich (1992) considered the replicator dynamics with a
large number of species and used techniques from the statistical physics of disordered systems
to show how, below a certain level of cooperation pressure (a parameter characterizing
the learning algorithm), the dynamics becomes unstable. More recently, Galla and Farmer
(2013) analysed random games and EWA learning, showing that high-dimensional chaos and
limit cycles could be observed in a significant portion of the parameter space, for negatively
correlated payoffs.
This paper bridges the two described literatures in that we exhaustively characterize the
parameter space of EWA in generic 2×2 games and we connect ex-post the learning dynamics
to specific classes of games based on the convergence properties of the learning algorithm,
rather than focusing ex-ante on any specific class of games. We show that convergence occurs
in acyclic 2×2 games, such as dominance-solvable, potential, coordination and supermodular
games (Nachbar, 1990; Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Milgrom and Roberts, 1991; Arieli and
Young, 2016), and that such games are more common if the payoffs are positively correlated;
the higher the correlation, the more likely the payoff matrix describes a coordination game,
with multiple fixed points (Galla and Farmer, 2013; Berg and Weigt, 1999). Moreover, we
generalize a number of results on the well-known instability of mixed strategy equilibria
(Stahl, 1988; Bena¨ım et al., 2009) by tuning the free parameters of EWA. For instance,
fictitious play converges to mixed strategy NE in 2 × 2 discoordination games (Miyazawa,
1961), whereas best-response dynamics (Cournot, 1838) does not. Both fictitious play and
best-response dynamics are limiting cases of EWA (Camerer and Ho, 1999) and we recover
their convergence properties through our analysis, but we also provide explicit thresholds
that define the onset of instability in between the two limits.
An important finding of this paper is that the unstable dynamics might be chaotic even
in 2×2 games (note that deterministic learning is not necessary for the dynamics to display
this property: chaos is well defined even in the presence of noise. See Crutchfield et al. 1982).
While Vilone et al. (2011) obtained this result by analysing a specific discretization of the
replicator dynamics, we are the first to find chaotic behaviour in a 2-dimensional strategy
space with reinforcement and belief learning algorithms. Due to the reduced number of
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pure strategies available to each player, we find low-dimensional chaos,4 in contrast with
Galla and Farmer (2013), who find high-dimensional chaotic attractors (which are consistent
with an essentially random and unpredictable learning dynamics) in games with many pure
strategies. Since we find a quasi-cyclical learning dynamics, it can sensibly be argued that
the pattern can be guessed by one of the players, who could then take advantage of her
forecast of the moves of her opponent in order to systematically outguess his choices, and
thereby perform better than him. In evolutionary terms, the player who can guess the
cyclical behaviour of her opponent has higher fitness and is eventually expected to take
over the entire population. This is the rational expectations argument of Muth (1961)
and would suggest that the cyclic behaviour is expected to die out. However, in line with
the view of the rational route to randomness (Brock and Hommes, 1997), this is not an
obvious outcome. The information cost for guessing the moves of the other player and
the interaction between two or more forecasting strategies easily yield complex dynamics,
preventing rational and perfectly informed players to outperform less sophisticated players.
Hommes et al. (2016) apply this formalism to the theory of learning in games by considering
the interplay between rational play and a short memory adjustment process such as best-
response dynamics or fictitious play in Cournot games. Rational players are able to outguess
the choices of their opponents, but complex dynamics may still occur. In a different context,
Huberman and Hogg (1988) show that more sophisticated learning algorithms may lead to
chaotic dynamics.
Another understandable critique is whether our learning algorithm can be considered as
representative of how players learn in reality, and whether limit cycles or chaos in the learn-
ing dynamics play a role in the real world and could be detected in experiments. Camerer
and Ho (1999) and Ho et al. (2007) fit the EWA model to experimental data in several classes
of games and show that it outperforms other learning models in most cases. However, it is
likely that the players would change their learning strategy as the game evolves, implying
that they learn how to learn. Stahl (1996) considered a model of rule learning where the
players are of different k-levels (Nagel, 1995) and change their k-level using reinforcement
learning. Crawford (1995) proposed a generalization of the standard belief learning algo-
rithms to take into account time-varying memory and idiosyncratic shocks. Would we find
the same qualitative learning dynamics if we used more sophisticated learning algorithms?
Our analysis suggests that limit cycles and chaos may theoretically be observed as long
as the players are willing to quickly switch their moves, independently of the reason why
they behave so. A property of the cycling behaviour, as opposed to the convergence to a
mixed strategy equilibrium, is the slower decay in the autocorrelation function of the moves
chosen by each player. In the language of time series, the sequence of moves by each player
exhibits persistence. This is a precise theoretical prediction that can be tested against data
on experimental learning of discoordination games.
Organization of the paper The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section
2 we define the classes of 2 × 2 games that we use in this paper; in Section 3 we describe
the learning model and a number of simplifications that help the subsequent analysis; in
Section 4 we fully characterize the learning dynamics as a function of the parameters and
we connect the classes of 2 × 2 games to randomly generated payoff matrices; in Section 5
we relax some strong assumptions used in the previous section and we prove that our results
are robust to stochasticity. Section 6 concludes.
2 Classes of 2-person, 2-strategy games
Based on the properties one wants to look at, it is possible to construct several classifications
of 2-person, 2-strategy (2×2) games. Rapoport et al. (1976) find 78 classes of games, which
can be reduced to 24 when less properties are considered. Here we are only concerned with
the number of Nash Equilibria (NE) and with their type, i.e. whether they are pure or
4The dimensionality of the chaotic attractors quantifies the departure from regular oscillations.
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mixed strategy NE. We only find 3 classes of 2×2 games: all such games belong to one of
these classes.
Consider the general 2×2 payoff bi-matrix (henceforth called payoff matrix):(
a, e b, g
c, f d, h
)
. (1)
The number and type of the NE depend on the pairwise ordering of the payoffs each
player compares, namely (a, c) and (b, d) for player Row, (e, g) and (f, h) for player Column.
There are 24 = 16 such orderings. We find the following classes of 2×2 games:
• Coordination and anticoordination games are respectively defined by the order-
ings a > c, d > b, e > g, h > f and a < c, d < b, e < g, h < f . Coordination 2×2
games have 2 pure strategy NE where the players choose the strategies with the same
labels, i.e. (1, 1) and (2, 2), and one mixed strategy NE. Two well-known examples of
coordination games are Stag-Hunt and Battle of the Sexes. What we name anticoor-
dination 2×2 games (there exists no standard terminology for such games) are largely
similar to coordination games, in that they also have two pure strategy and one mixed
strategy NE, but in the pure strategy NE the players choose strategies with differ-
ent labels, i.e. (1, 2) and (2, 1). A well known example of an anticoordination game
is Chicken. From a mathematical point of view, coordination and anticoordination
games are largely similar, so we group them together in most cases.
• Discoordination games are defined by the orderings a > c, d > b, e < g, h < f
and a < c, d < b, e > g, h > f (again, there exists no standard terminology for
this class of games). They have a unique mixed strategy NE and no pure strategy
NE because the players have incentives to coordinate on different profiles of strategies.
The prototypical discoordination game is Matching Pennies.
• Dominance-solvable games are defined by all 12 remaining possible orderings. They
have a unique pure strategy NE, obtainable from the elimination of strongly dominated
strategies. For instance, if a > c, d < b, e > g, h < f , the NE is (1, 1). The Prisoner
Dilemma is a 2× 2 dominance-solvable game.
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, Chapter 10, p. 120) find a very similar classification with
respect to the replicator dynamics. The only difference is that in their setting coordination
and anticoordination games are completely equivalent. This is correct for the relatively
simple functional form of the replicator dynamics, but inexact for more complex learning
algorithms such as the one analysed in this paper.
It will be very useful in the following to relate the classes of 2× 2 games described above
to the following key parameters:
A =
1
4
(a+ d− b− c) ,
B =
1
4
(a+ b− c− d) ,
C =
1
4
(e+ h− f − g) ,
D =
1
4
(e+ f − g − h) .
(2)
The parameter A indicates the preference of player Row for outcomes of the type (1, 1)
or (2, 2) over the cases (1, 2) and (2, 1). Similarly C is a measure for the preference of player
Column for the same “diagonal” outcomes. It is then sensible to use the product AC as
a measure of overall coordination. We then name AC as the “coordination” parameter. If
both A and C are positive and large, coordination is positive and large and both players
prefer outcomes (1, 1) and (2, 2). We have a coordination game and learning may intuitively
display multiple fixed points. If both A and C are negative and large, coordination is still
positive and large. The payoff matrix describes an anticoordination game and both players
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prefer outcomes (1, 2) and (2, 1). If A is positive and large and C is negative and large,
coordination is negative and large, one player prefers outcomes (1, 1) and (2, 2), and the
other prefers (1, 2) and (2, 1). This is a discoordination game; intuitively, learning may not
converge to a fixed point.
The parameter B is a measure for the dominance of player Row’s first strategy over her
second, and similarly D measures the dominance of player Column’s first strategy over her
second. We refer to |BD| as “dominance” parameter (we take the absolute value of the
product BD because its sign only determines which profile of strategies is selected as the
NE, but does not change the type of game). If dominance is large the payoff matrix describes
a dominance-solvable game and it is sensible that the learning dynamics is characterized by
a unique fixed point, close to the pure strategy NE.
These statements are made more precise in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (i) In symmetric games (A = C, B = D), where coordination (A2) and
dominance (B2) are positive, it is equivalent to consider |A| as the coordination parameter
and |B| as the dominance parameter. If coordination is larger than dominance (|A| > |B|),
the payoff matrix describes a coordination (if A > 0) or anticoordination (if A < 0) game.
Viceversa, if |A| < |B|, it describes a dominance-solvable game.
(ii) In asymmetric games (A 6= C, B 6= D), if coordination in absolute value is smaller
than dominance (|AC| < |BD|), the game is dominance-solvable; in the opposite case
(|AC| > |BD|), we cannot disambiguate between the classes of games using only these
parameters. In particular, if both |B| < |A| and |D| < |C|, the payoff matrix describes a
coordination (if AC > 0, A > 0, C > 0), anticoordination (if AC > 0, A < 0, C < 0) or
discoordination (if AC < 0) game. On the other hand, if |B| > |A| or |D| > |C|, even if
|AC| > |BD|, the game is dominance-solvable. However, the larger the value of coordination
(compared to dominance), the less likely the payoff matrix describes a dominance-solvable
game.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix A, where we also show that there are only
4 effective degrees of freedom in the payoff matrix, for what concerns the NE and the
dynamical properties of EWA learning.
3 The learning model
In this section we describe Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) learning and we list all
mathematical simplifications that ease the subsequent analysis. In Section 3.1 we provide a
formal definition of EWA and discuss the meaning of its parameters. In Section 3.2 we start
to simplify the dynamics by assuming that the experience (one of the EWA components)
has already reached a steady state and by taking a deterministic limit. In Section 3.3 we
specify a diffeomorphism that allows to substantially simplify the equations governing the
learning dynamics, with no loss in generality.
3.1 Experience-Weighted Attraction learning
Camerer and Ho (1999) proposed EWA as a hybrid of reinforcement (the players learn on the
basis of the performance of their actions) and belief learning (the players construct beliefs
on the possible actions of their opponents and respond to these beliefs). They noticed that
the two largely studied classes of learning algorithms are in fact equivalent if the players
also consider forgone payoffs.5 Thanks to the generality of EWA, the fit with experimental
data is better than with pure reinforcement or pure belief learning. The reason is that real
players learn using both information about performance and beliefs.
We now introduce some notation. Consider a 2-person, 2-strategy normal form game.
We index the players by µ ∈ {Row = R,Column = C} and the pure strategies by i = 1, 2.
We denote by x(t) the probability for player R to play pure strategy 1 at time t, and by
5The other requirement is that they average between the current payoff for a certain strategy and the past
tendency to play the same strategy, see Section 3.2.
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y(t) the probability for player C to play pure strategy 1 at time t.6 We further denote by
sµ(t) the pure strategy which is actually chosen by player µ at time t, so that Π
µ(i, s−µ(t))
represents the payoff that player µ receives at t if she plays pure strategy i and the other
player chooses the pure strategy s−µ(t).
In EWA, the mixed strategies are determined from the so-called attractions or propen-
sities Qµi (t) following a logit rule. For example, the probability for player R to play pure
strategy 1 is given by
x(t+ 1) =
eβQ
R
1 (t+1)
eβQ
R
1 (t+1) + eβQ
R
2 (t+1)
, (3)
where β is the payoff sensitivity or intensity of choice7 and a similar expression holds for
y(t+ 1). The propensities update as follows:
Qµi (t+ 1) =
(1− α)N (t)Qµi (t) + (δ + (1− δ)I(i, sµ(t+ 1))Πµ(i, s−µ(t+ 1))
N (t+ 1) , (4)
where N (t+1) = (1−α)(1−κ)N (t)+1. Here N (t) represents experience and increases with
the number of rounds played; the more it grows, the smaller becomes the influence of the
received payoffs on the attractions. The propensities change according to the received payoff
when playing action i against the strategies s−µ by the other players, i.e. Πµ(i, s−µ(t+ 1)).
The indicator function I(i, sµ(t + 1)) is equal to 1 if i is the actual pure strategy that was
played by µ at time t + 1, that is i = sµ(t + 1). All attractions (those corresponding to
strategies that were and were not played) are updated with weight δ, while an additional
weight 1−δ is given to the specific attraction corresponding to the strategy that was actually
played. Finally, the memory loss parameter α determines how quickly previous attraction
and experience are discounted and the parameter κ interpolates between cumulative and
average reinforcement learning (see below).
3.2 Steady state experience and deterministic limit
Here we make two substantial, albeit rather innocuous, simplifications. First, EWA has
two state variables: attraction and experience. The dynamics of the latter is trivial, as it
reaches a fixed point extremely fast (for many combinations of parameters, the time scale
of convergence is of the order of 2-3 time steps). Therefore we assume, with a small loss in
generality, that experience has already reached a fixed point N ? when the dynamics starts.
To ensure the existence of such a fixed point we need to assume that (1−α)(1−κ) < 1. This
restriction only rules out standard fictitious play, in which all past actions are taken into
account with the same weight and therefore the relative weight of the most recent actions
becomes smaller and smaller. There is no further loss in generality, as all other reinforcement
and belief learning algorithms can still be viewed as a particular case of the EWA dynamics
once N (t) has reached a fixed point.
The update rule (4) now reads:
Qµi (t+1) = (1−α)Qµi (t)+(1−(1−α)(1−κ))(δ+(1−δ)I(i, sµ(t+1))Πµ(i, s−µ(t+1)). (5)
The interpretation for κ is now more transparent: if κ = 1 the past payoffs are cumulated,
hence cumulative reinforcement learning; if κ = 0 the past attraction and the current payoff
are averaged with weight given by the memory loss parameter α, hence average reinforcement
learning. Note that the two learning algorithms can be made equivalent by rescaling the
propensities (or equivalently the intensity of choice) by α (see Galla and Farmer 2013).
6Due to the normalization condition, the learning dynamics is fully characterized by {x(t), y(t)}∞t=0.
7The larger β, the more the players consider the attractions in determining their strategy. In the limit β →∞
the players choose with certainty the pure strategy with the larger attraction. In the limit β → 0 they choose
randomly, disregarding the attractions.
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Following Camerer and Ho (1999), note that belief learning is recovered if δ = 1 and at
least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
• There is no memory (α = 1). If, in addition, β → ∞, one recovers best-response
dynamics (Cournot, 1838), in that the players best respond to the last period beliefs
only;
• Average reinforcement learning (κ = 0).
Therefore, by studying the dynamic properties of (3) and (5) we are considering a wide
class of learning algorithms, including reinforcement learning, best-response dynamics and
weighted fictitious play. As a benchmark case we consider cumulative reinforcement learning
(Section 4), which excludes belief learning, but we allow for average reinforcement learning
in Section 5.2, where we generalize the results to belief learning.
We make another bold assumption in this section, which will then be relaxed in Section
5.1: we assume that the players play against each other many times before updating their
propensities, so that the empirical frequency of their moves corresponds to their mixed
strategy. This sort of argument was already made by Crawford (1974) and justified by
Conlisk (1993a) in terms of “two-rooms experiments”: the players only interact through a
computer console and need to specify several moves before they know the moves of their
opponent. This assumption is useful from a theoretical point of view and does not affect the
results in most cases (Section 5.1): the only difference when noise is allowed is a blurring of
the dynamical properties.
We denote by Πµi the expected payoff for player µ playing pure strategy i at time t, given
that player −µ plays a distribution of strategies given by her mixed strategy. An important
remark is that, under the deterministic assumption, it is intended that δ = 1, as it would be
ambiguous to distinguish between the strategies which were and were not played (as long as
the players choose a non-degenerate mixed strategy, both pure strategies would be chosen
by each player with non-zero frequency), so in order to recover belief learning it is really
just enough to consider average reinforcement learning (κ = 0).
Finally, it is useful to combine (3) and (5) and to write the probabilities x(t + 1) and
y(t + 1) directly in terms of the same probabilities at time t, that is x(t) and y(t). In the
deterministic limit (and so with δ = 1) we get
x(t+ 1) =
x(t)1−αeβ(1−(1−α)(1−κ))ΠR1 (y(t))
Zx , (6)
where Zx = x(t)1−αeβ(1−(1−α)(1−κ))ΠR1 (y(t)) + (1 − x(t))1−αeβ(1−(1−α)(1−κ))ΠR2 (y(t)) and an
analogous expression holds for y(t+ 1).
3.3 Transformed coordinates
The remaining simplification implies no loss of generality and matters for technical reasons:
we propose a diffeomorphism that transforms the coordinates of the learning dynamics
and leads to a simpler set of equations. As we consider the combinations of parameters
in the transformed coordinates, the taxonomy of the learning dynamics starts naturally to
emerge. A diffeomorphism between a coordinate space (x, y), henceforth denoted by original
coordinates, to a coordinate space (x˜, y˜), henceforth denoted by transformed coordinates,
leaves the dynamical properties (e.g. Jacobian, Lyapunov Exponents) in (x, y) unchanged
in (x˜, y˜), thanks to a well-known property in dynamical systems theory (Ott, 2002).
We consider the generic 2× 2 payoff bimatrix (1) and the diffeomorphism
x˜ = −1
2
ln
(
1
x
− 1
)
,
y˜ = −1
2
ln
(
1
y
− 1
)
.
(7)
10
In terms of the transformed coordinates, the map (6) writes:
x˜(t+ 1) = (1− α)x˜(t) + β(1− (1− α)(1− κ))(A tanh y˜(t) +B),
y˜(t+ 1) = (1− α)y˜(t) + β(1− (1− α)(1− κ))(C tanh x˜(t) +D), (8)
where A, B, C and D have been defined in (2).
The original coordinates are restricted to x(t) ∈ [0, 1] and y(t) ∈ [0, 1], the transformed
coordinates on the other hand take values on the entire real axis. Pure strategies (x, y) ∈
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} in the original coordinates map to (x˜, y˜) ∈ {(±∞,±∞)} in the
transformed coordinates. Note also that mixed strategies where the players choose among
their actions with the same probability, i.e. x, y = 1/2, are mapped to x˜, y˜ = 0.
The inverse transformation is given by
x =
1
1 + e−2x˜
,
y =
1
1 + e−2y˜
.
(9)
4 Taxonomy of learning dynamics
We analyse the dynamical properties of EWA learning in generic 2 × 2 games. In Section
4.1 we analyse the existence and the stability of fixed points. Depending on the class of
game and on the learning parameters, the fixed points may be stable or unstable. In Section
4.2 we simulate the learning dynamics in settings where the fixed points are unstable. We
find limit cycles or low-dimensional chaos in discoordination games. In order to quantify
the prevalence of each class of games, in Section 4.3 we draw payoff matrices at random,
showing that dominance-solvable games are the most common, coordination games can be
observed if the payoffs are positively correlated, while discoordination games are associated
with negatively correlated payoffs. Finally, in Section 4.4 we state a formal result: under
EWA learning, the profiles of pure strategies, despite being fixed points of the learning
dynamics, are always unstable (but a nearby stable fixed point may exist).
For convenience, in this section we focus on deterministic learning (which implies δ = 1)
and consider cumulative reinforcement learning (κ = 1). The extensions are considered in
Section 5.
4.1 Fixed point analysis
We first analyse the existence and the position of the fixed points in the strategy simplex,
and then we consider their stability. In Section 4.1.1 we focus on symmetric games. We find
that there exists always at least one stable fixed point, which may or may not correspond
to the NE. In Section 4.1.2 we consider “antisymmetric” games, where, for any combination
of strategies, the payoffs received by one player are the opposite of the payoffs received by
the other player (this does not necessarily correspond to zero-sum games, see below). For
discoordination games, the learning dynamics may not settle to a fixed point. Finally, in
Section 4.1.3, we analyse the most general class of asymmetric games.
4.1.1 Symmetric games
We start from the simplest case from the point of view of the analysis, namely symmetric
2 × 2 games. Due to symmetry, both players have identical payoff parameters, ΠRij = ΠCij ,
so A = C and B = D. Therefore, coordination is A2 and dominance is B2. Recall from
Proposition 1 that if |A| > |B| and A > 0, the payoff matrix describes a coordination game;
if |A| > |B| and A < 0, the payoff matrix describes an anticoordination game; if |B| > |A|,
the game is dominance-solvable.
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The fixed points in the transformed coordinates can be obtained from (8), by setting
x˜(t + 1) = x˜(t) = x˜? and y˜(t + 1) = y˜(t) = y˜?. The fixed point equation is x˜? = Ψ(x˜?),
where
Ψ(x˜?) =
β
α
[
A tanh
(
β
α
(A tanh x˜? +B)
)
+B
]
. (10)
An identical expression holds for y˜?. Note that the EWA parameters α and β combine
as the ratio α/β (or β/α). It makes sense to define α/β as the “irrationality” parameter
because it is large if there is substantial memory loss and/or small intensity of choice. Eq.
(10) can have either 1 or 3 solutions. If there are 3 intersections between Ψ(x˜?) and the x˜?
line, we denote as central solution the intersection with an intermediate value for x˜? and by
lateral solutions the intersections with the maximum and minimum values. Note that the
fixed points are a vector (x˜?, y˜?), so it is not enough to compute the solutions of Eq. (10),
one also needs to find the right couplings by replacing the possible combinations in (8).8
Thanks to the fact that the maps (6) and (8) are topologically conjugate, their Jacobian
is the same. We compute it from (8):
J |x˜?,y˜? =
(
1− α Aβ
cosh2(y˜?)
Cβ
cosh2(x˜?)
1− α
)
. (11)
The eigenvalues are
λ± = 1− α± |A|β 1
cosh(x˜?) cosh(y˜?)
. (12)
Since 1 − α > 0, the leading eigenvalue is λ+ and it is enough to study that for the
stability properties. After a little algebra we get the stability condition
α
β
cosh(x˜?) cosh(y˜?)− |A| ≥ 0. (13)
The shape of Ψ(x˜?) varies according to the irrationality (α/β), coordination (|A|) and
dominance (|B|) parameters. Due to the strong non-linearity of Ψ(x˜?), it is not possible to
study it analytically in full. Therefore, we first solve Eq. (10) numerically, and then provide
a mathematical analysis of a number of specific cases. Figure 2 shows the properties of the
fixed points obtained from the numerical solution of (10), keeping irrationality constant,
i.e. α/β = 1 (since the parameters combine as βαA and
β
αB, it is equivalent to change the
values of A and B). We also check the stability of the fixed points by using Eq. (13). We
find that there is always at least one stable fixed point. If there are multiple fixed points,
only the lateral solutions are stable. For small values of the payoffs, such that the players
do not have strong incentives to choose a specific pure strategy, learning converges to a
mixed strategy fixed point, where the players randomly choose between the pure strategies.
If dominance is larger than coordination, the payoff matrix describes a dominance-solvable
game and learning converges to a pure strategy fixed point corresponding to the NE. If
coordination is larger than dominance, the payoff matrix may represent a coordination
or an anticoordination game. Note that multiple fixed points are much more likely in
anticoordination games. To see why this is the case, consider the following payoff matrices,
with A = C = ±1.75 and B = D = 1.25:
Πcoord =
(
6, 6 0, 0
0, 0 1, 1
)
; Πanticoord =
(
0, 0 6, 1
1, 6 0, 0
)
. (14)
While in Πcoord the NE which yields payoffs (6,6) is to be clearly preferred over the
NE yielding (1,1), so it is reasonable that learning only converges to the preferred outcome
(unique pure strategy fixed point), in Πanticoord there is no preferred NE, so it is sensible
that learning displays multiple fixed points. This is indeed what happens in the top right
and top left corners of Figure 2, which correspond to the payoff matrices in (14).
8It never occurs that the components of a fixed point are the central and lateral solutions: either both
components are central solutions, or both components are lateral solutions.
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Figure 2: Numerical solution of Eq. (10) for α/β = 1 and several values of A = C and B = D.
If 0.3 < x? < 0.7 and 0.3 < y? < 0.7, the solution is classified as a “mixed strategy fixed point”.
All unique fixed points are stable; if there are multiple fixed points, only the “lateral solutions”
are stable. The overall picture is that for small values of the payoffs learning converges to a
mixed strategy fixed point; if dominance is strong, to a pure strategy fixed point; if coordination
is strong, to multiple fixed points. There are noticeable differences between coordination and
anticoordination games. This figure corresponds to the βαAC > 0 semiplane in Figure 1, up to
folding along the y-axis (because both A = C < 0 and A = C > 0 yield AC > 0).
We now proceed with the mathematical solution for a number of specific cases. We first
set B = 0, and study the interplay of the coordination parameter, |A|, and the irrationality
parameter, α/β. The lateral solutions do not exist if
β
α
|A| ≤ 1. (15)
The interpretation is straightforward: if irrationality is large (so its inverse is small)
and/or coordination is small (i.e. the absolute value of the payoffs is small), there is a
unique fixed point in the centre of the strategy simplex. This transition can be seen for
B = 0 and A = ±1 in Figure 2.
We now consider B > 0. It is possible to check in Eq. (10) that a large value of βα |B|
flattens Ψ(x˜?) (because it makes the argument less sensitive to the values of x˜?) and moves
the offset Ψ(0) away from zero. Therefore, for a sufficiently large value of βα |B| there is a
unique fixed point far from the centre of the simplex. This is indeed what happens in Figure
2.
Stability is addressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. We consider a symmetric 2× 2 game. The following results hold:
(i) if B = 0 and βα |A| ≤ 1, the unique fixed point is stable.
(ii) if B = 0 and βα |A| → 1+ or βα |A| → +∞, the fixed point whose components are the
central solutions is unstable and the fixed points whose components are the lateral solutions
are stable. In particular, at βα |A| = 1 a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation occurs.
(iii) if βα |B| → +∞ and B  A, the unique fixed point is stable.
The proof is in Appendix B.
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4.1.2 “Antisymmetric” games
So far, we analysed the learning dynamics in dominance-solvable, coordination and antico-
ordination games. We now want to focus on the remaining class of 2 × 2 games, namely
discoordination games. As these are not symmetric by definition, we consider “antisymmet-
ric” games, where ΠRij = −ΠCij , and so A = −C, B = −D. Note that this condition does not
generally define zero-sum games, as the latter are rather defined by the equality ΠRij = −ΠCji
(so the two classes of games correspond only if ΠRij = −ΠCij = 0 for i 6= j). Again, if B > A
the game is dominance-solvable, but if A > B we have a discoordination game.
The fixed points (x˜?, y˜?) are again obtained from (8):
x˜? =
β
α
[
−A tanh
(
β
α
(A tanh x˜? +B)
)
+B
]
,
y˜? =
β
α
[
−A tanh
(
β
α
(A tanh y˜? +B)
)
−B
]
,
(16)
where we have used the identity tanh(−x) = − tanh(x). It is immediate to note from (16)
that there exists a unique fixed point. Indeed, the functions on the RHS are monotonically
decreasing, so only one intersection with the x˜? and y˜? lines is possible. Moreover, given
AC = −A2 < 0, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian (11) are complex:
λ± = 1− α± i β |A|
cosh(x˜?) cosh(y˜?)
. (17)
The stability condition reads:
β√
2α− α2
|A|
cosh(x˜?) cosh(y˜?)
≤ 1. (18)
In Figure 3 we show the properties of the unique fixed point obtained from the numeri-
cal solution of (16), for several values of A and B. We also check the stability of the fixed
points by using Eq. (18). Focusing on small B, a larger value of |A| or a smaller value of√
2α− α2/β (which is close to the irrationality parameter α/β) imply a more likely instabil-
ity. The intuition is straightforward: if the players are rational and/or have strong incentives
to switch a strategy which is not performing well, they follow the cycle of best-responses
in the payoff matrix and keep switching their moves, rather than smoothly converging to
a fixed point in the centre of the simplex, where they would randomize between the pure
strategies. On the contrary, if B is large (with respect to A), the learning dynamics simply
converges towards a fixed point close to the pure strategy NE.
We conclude this section by focusing on one specific example of discoordination games,
where dominance is null: B = D = 0, C = −A. The unique fixed point is (0, 0) and is stable
if (we assume without loss of generality A > 0, C < 0)
β√
2α− α2A ≤ 1. (19)
Replacing the values of α and β used in Figure 3, the fixed point becomes unstable for
A? = 1.224, which corresponds to the transition observed in Figure 3.
4.1.3 Asymmetric games
We now consider asymmetric 2 × 2 games. In general, the payoff parameters are differ-
ent for the two players, so A 6= C and B 6= D. There is a larger variety of behaviours,
but in general asymmetric games are widely similar to their symmetric counterparts (e.g.
asymmetric dominance-solvable games are widely similar to symmetric dominance-solvable
games), except that the player with the strongest incentive to play a certain move plays
mixed strategies farther from the centre of the strategy simplex.
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Figure 3: Numerical solution of Eq. (20) for α = β = 0.8 and several values of A = −C and B =
−D. If 0.3 < x? < 0.7 and 0.3 < y? < 0.7, the solution is classified as a “mixed strategy fixed
point”. There is always a unique fixed point, which may become unstable in discoordination
games for low values of irrationality and/or high (absolute) values of coordination. The intuition
is that the players have strong incentives to try and improve their payoffs, so they fail to
coordinate to the mixed strategy NE and the learning dynamics keeps cycling. This figure
corresponds to the βαAC < 0 semiplane in Figure 1.
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The fixed points (x˜?, y˜?) are given by
x˜? =
β
α
[
A tanh
(
β
α
(C tanh x˜? +D)
)
+B
]
,
y˜? =
β
α
[
C tanh
(
β
α
(A tanh y˜? +B)
)
+D
]
.
(20)
Without loss of generality, we can write the (combinations of) payoffs of player Column
as a rescaled version of the (combinations of) payoffs of player Row, that is C = WA and
D = ZB, with W and Z scale factors. The magnitudes of W and Z quantify the imbalance
in coordination and dominance for the two players. For instance, if W is large, player
Column has stronger incentives to converge on one of the pure strategy NE (just consider
the payoff matrix (1), with a = d = 1, e = h = 5, b = c = f = g = 0). Consistently, the
height of the hyperbolic tangent (20) for player Column is larger, leading to an intersection
with the y˜? line which is farther away from zero (y˜?  x˜?). Therefore, player Column
will choose a mixed strategy farther from the centre of the simplex. Likewise, if Z is large
(consider a = 1, d = −1, e = 5, h = −5, b = c = f = g = 0), player Column ends up to
a fixed point closer to the pure strategy NE. Concerning the signs, the sign of Z does not
matter in determining the stability properties, while the sign of W has a substantial effect.
If W > 0, we find little difference with the symmetric case; if W < 0 the payoff matrix may
define discoordination games (the additional condition is that |B| < |A| and |D| < |C|),
which may have no stable fixed points, as shown in Section 4.1.2.
4.2 Simulations of the unstable dynamics
We choose a parameter setting where the fixed point of the discoordination game is unstable.
Figure 4 shows some examples of the dynamics for some values of α and β, for a given
payoff matrix. The dynamics superficially looks like following a limit cycle, whose shape is
governed by α and β: Fig. 4a shows that, for high α and β, the players frequently change
their strategies, whereas in Fig. 4b, for low values of α and β, the dynamics is smoother;
in Fig. 4c, where α is very small but β is reasonably high, the players spend a lot of time
playing mostly one pure strategy and then quickly switch to the other one (because they
have long memory). Finally, in Fig. 4d we choose B 6= 0: the discrepancy between the pure
strategies seems to yield the most irregular dynamics.
In order to get further insights into the learning dynamics, Figure 5 represents the
bifurcation diagrams and the largest Lyapunov Exponent (LLE),9 varying α and β. We
focus on the values of the payoff matrix in Fig. 4d, as the behaviour of the learning dynamics
in Fig. 4a is only marginally chaotic. Figures 5a and 5c refer to a parameter setting where
the fixed point is unstable, and we observe alternating limit cycles and chaotic bands. On
the other hand, in Figures 5b and 5d, for small intensity of choice, that is β ∈ (0, 0.5), we
observe convergence towards the fixed point in the centre of the simplex. Interestingly, for
values β ∈ (0.5, 0.8) the dynamics is not periodic, but the LLE is almost null. This case
corresponds to a marginally chaotic behaviour, like the one in Fig. 4a. For larger values of β
we observe again chaotic bands and limit cycles. At the points where the limit cycles become
chaotic we can observe a higher density of trajectories, probably related to the intermittency
scenario of transition to chaos (Pomeau and Manneville, 1980).
Figure 6 shows10 that chaos is more frequently observed if one of the pure strategies is
dominant over the other, B > 0. Moreover, the LLE is always negative if B > A (consistently
9Since the system is 2-dimensional, in order to compute the Lyapunov exponents it is necessary to periodically
orthogonalize the unit vectors using a Gram-Schmidt procedure, see Benettin et al. (1980). Note that, while this
is strictly necessary only in order to obtain the whole Lyapunov spectrum, and so compute the Kaplan-Yorke
dimension, in practice the estimate of the LLE is much more accurate if one uses the orthogonalization method
even just to compute the LLE.
10Since we choose C = −A and D = −B, there is a 4-fold symmetry in the AB plane, so we only plot the 1st
quadrant.
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Figure 4: Time series of the probabilities x (in blue) and y (in red). The payoff parameters are:
b = c = f = g = 0, a = d = 4 and e = h = −4 in panels (a)-(c), and a = −11.8, d = −1.8,
e = 11.8 and h = 1.8 in panel (d). Cyclical and chaotic dynamics occur.
with the diagram depicted in Figure 3) and is larger for high absolute values of the payoffs
(so that A and B are larger).
4.3 Random 2×2 payoff matrices
In the above sections, the taxonomy of learning dynamics is determined by three classes of
2×2 games: dominance-solvable, (anti)coordination and discoordination games. It is inter-
esting to understand the relative frequency of each class of games, under some appropriate
probability distribution over the payoff matrices. While it is true that game theory is usually
concerned with specific scenarios of strategic interaction, which are properly described by
a unique payoff matrix, finding which games are prevalent under a random generation of
the payoff matrix would shed light on biological and social phenomena where the nature of
the interactions is not known a priori. We choose an ensemble of payoff matrices obtained
by constraining the mean, variance and correlation of the payoff elements. In particular,
we assume that the mean is 0, the variance is 1 and the two payoffs for the same profile
of pure strategies in the payoff matrix are correlated by a parameter Γ. A value Γ = −1
would imply anticorrelation and describe a zero-sum game, while negative values for the
correlation, Γ < 0, are more generally associated with competitive games; on the contrary
Γ = 1 reveals perfect correlation and positive values of Γ are related to cooperative games.
Finally, Γ = 0 implies lack of correlation. Under these constraints, the maximum entropy
distribution is a bivariate Gaussian with specified mean and covariance matrix (Galla and
Farmer, 2013).
Figure 7 represents the fraction of games which belong to each of the three classes, as a
function of the correlation parameter Γ. We see that for all values of Γ, dominance-solvable
games are the most likely. Positive values of Γ are associated with (anti)coordination games,
which display multiple fixed points under EWA learning, whereas for negative values of Γ
it is more likely to obtain a discoordination game, and consequently limit cycles or chaos
in the learning dynamics. Indeed, this was observed by Galla and Farmer (2013), who
find convergence to multiple fixed points in a semiplane Γ > 0 and unstable dynamics
in a semiplane Γ < 0 (in both cases, α/β should be low). A difference with Galla and
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Figure 5: Bifurcation diagrams and largest Lyapunov exponent for b = c = f = g = 0,
a = −11.8, d = −1.8, e = 11.8 and h = 1.8. Panels (a)-(c): β = 1, α varying. Panels (b)-(d):
α = 0.7, β varying. Low-dimensional chaos may be observed.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6: Largest Lyapunov exponent as a function of the parameters A and B. The colour scale
is set such that chaos is observed from green to red. The parameters are: C = −A, D = −B,
β = 1, α = 0.7 in panel (a), α = 0.1 in panel (b). Chaos is more likely if there is a discrepancy
between the pure strategies, B > 0, and the payoffs are quite large in absolute value.
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Figure 7: Fraction of dominance-solvable, (anti)coordination and discoordination games, as
a function of the correlation Γ. These results are averaged over 10000 random draws of the
(Gaussian) payoff matrix.
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Farmer (2013) is that, whereas they find consistently unstable behaviour in certain regions
of the parameter space, we cannot rule out convergence to a fixed point for Γ < 0. In fact,
for all values of Γ, most payoff matrices describe dominance-solvable games, which always
display a stable fixed point. This difference might be explained by the fact that Galla and
Farmer (2013) consider high-dimensional strategy spaces, whereas we are restricted to two
pure strategies. A reasonable conjecture would be that by increasing the number of pure
strategies the fixed points of the learning dynamics may become unstable. We leave the
exploration of this conjecture to future work.
4.4 The pure strategy NE are unstable
Here we show that the NE in pure strategies are “infinitely” unstable.
Proposition 3. Consider a generic 2 × 2 game and the learning dynamics in the original
coordinates (6). At the profiles of pure strategies, (x, y) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}, for
positive memory loss, α > 0, the Jacobian has infinite elements along the main diagonal
and null elements along the antidiagonal.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in Appendix C.
A clarification is worth here: while the NE in pure strategies are formally unstable (unless
α = 0), for most values of the parameters there is a fixed point nearby. In particular, if
irrationality is not too high and the absolute values of the payoffs are not too small, it is
likely that one of the fixed points will be quite close to the NE in pure strategies. This
result could be anticipated, since for, e.g., dominance-solvable games, a reasonable learning
dynamics is expected to converge sufficiently close to the NE.
5 Extensions
We generalize the results in Section 4 by relaxing two seemingly restricting assumptions. In
Section 5.1 we drop the simplification of deterministic learning and we analyse the stochastic
learning dynamics. All previous results still hold and the only effect of this extension is a
blurring of the dynamical properties. In Section 5.2 we analyse the more general case where
the parameter κ, which interpolates between average and cumulative reinforcement learning,
is not restricted to be κ = 1. This allows us to recover belief learning and to reproduce
the well-known result about the convergence of fictitious play in 2 × 2 games. Again, the
analysis is not substantially different, in that it is enough to rescale the intensity of choice
by a value proportional to κ.
5.1 Stochastic learning
When playing a game, except for very specific experimental arrangements (Conlisk, 1993a),
the players would update their propensities after observing each move by their opponent.
This questions whether the deterministic dynamics (6), which assumes that the participants
of the game play against each other many times before updating their propensities, provides
robust conclusions. We interpolate from the deterministic limit by considering batches of size
T , where the players sample their mixed strategies. The limit T →∞ recovers deterministic
learning, whereas actual learning would occur with T = 1. As noted in Section 3.2, unless
T = 1, the meaning of the parameter δ in unclear. Indeed, a value of δ different from 1
implies that the players give an additional update to the attraction corresponding to the
move which they chose. This rule is not well defined if they play against each other many
times before updating their attractions, as they might choose both pure strategies at least
once. However, for T = 1 we consider several values of δ and we show that, the lower the
value of δ, the more noisy becomes the learning dynamics, as there is an additional source of
stochasticity given by which strategy the player randomly chooses, further to which strategy
is randomly chosen by his opponent.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to systematically study the effect of noise on the
learning dynamics, and we refer the reader to Galla (2009) for a study on the effect of noise
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on learning, and to Crutchfield et al. (1982) for a more general discussion on the effect of
noise on the properties of dynamical systems. In the following we show a few numerical
examples where we investigate what happens as we progressively increase the level of noise.
We simply describe our findings and we leave most of the numerical support to Appendix D.
We stress that the dynamical properties in the deterministic limit, in order to be considered
as robust, need to hold down to T = 1, as that is the natural choice for a realistic learning
dynamics. We focus on the three classes of games which we identified in the paper.
Dominance-solvable games Provided that the irrationality parameter is not too high,
the players converge close to the pure strategy NE (Figures D.1 (a)-(d)). After an irregular
transient, as the learning dynamics moves close to the faces of the simplex, it becomes
remarkably stable. On the contrary, if α/β is high, the players converge to the centre of the
simplex, as it occurs with deterministic learning (Figures D.1 (e)-(f)). However, the learning
dynamics is much more irregular. The asymptotic learning behaviour is explained by two
factors: deviations from the previous moves, and their effect. If the players always played
the same moves, the learning dynamics would converge to a fixed point. But as one of them
switched her move, we would observe a perturbation from such a fixed point. This explains
in part why, close to the centre of the simplex, the learning dynamics is more irregular: the
players converge to a mixed strategy where they choose each move roughly with the same
probability. The other factor is that the attractions are large at the faces of the simplex, so
the relative magnitude of their update (due to the deviation) is smaller. We also observe
another pattern in Figures D.1 (a)-(d): the higher the level of noise (i.e., the smaller T
and/or the smaller δ), the more irregular is the transient.
(Anti)Coordination games As for dominance-solvable games, we observe conver-
gence to a fixed point close to one of the pure strategy NE (for low levels of irrationality).
We investigate whether noise can help reaching the Pareto-Optimal NE, as it does in the
theory of stochastic stability (Young, 1993). Given the previous remark on the effect of the
noise near the faces of the simplex, we expect that stochastic learning can help reaching the
Pareto-Optimal NE only in the first steps of the dynamics. This conjecture is confirmed
by the numerical simulations in Figure D.2. We find that EWA is path dependent, differ-
ently from the learning algorithms introduced by (Young, 1993), which are based on ergodic
Markov Chains. With EWA, the learning dynamics reaches the Pareto-Optimal NE only if
there is a favourable fluctuation in the first stage of the dynamics.
Discoordination games In Section 4 we identify two learning behaviours: if irrational-
ity is high, the dynamics converges to the centre of the strategy simplex and the players
simply randomize between their moves; if irrationality is low, the players do not converge to
an equilibrium and the mixed strategies keep oscillating. This distinction survives when we
allow for noise. In Figure 8 we plot the stochastic time series for both behaviours. In Figure
8a the mixed strategy fixed point of the corresponding deterministic dynamics is unstable
and the stochastic learning dynamics is chaotic (the parameters are the same as in Fig. 5),
whereas in Figure 8b the mixed strategy fixed point is an attractor of the (deterministic)
dynamics. It is immediately clear that in the latter case there is a total lack of autocorre-
lation in the moves by each player (because the dynamics does not spend much time near
the faces of the simplex), whereas in the former the autocorrelation function decays more
slowly as a function of the time lag. These results are confirmed in Figure 9 and constitute
a precise theoretical prediction that can be tested against data on experimental learning
of discoordination games. Finally, Figure 10 represents the same bifurcation diagram and
largest Lyapunov exponents as in Figs. 5a and 5c respectively, with the only difference that
we consider stochastic learning with T = 1. For small values of α the LLE is still positive,
so the dynamics is chaotic. We consider several values of T in Figure D.3. We observe the
equivalence between parametric and additive11 noise (Crutchfield et al., 1982): the effect of
11In fact, the noise source induced by finite T is not additive, but it is always possible to express the noise
through a properly defined additive stochastic term in the dynamical equations.
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noise on the properties of dynamical systems equivalently occurs as a perturbation of their
trajectories or as a perturbation of their parameter values. By progressively increasing the
level of noise, we observe the smoothing of both the bifurcation diagram and the plot rep-
resenting the LLE, losing the finely alternating structure with bands of chaos and windows
of regularity.
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Figure 8: Time series of the probabilities x (in blue) and y (in red), for stochastic learning with
T = 1. The payoff parameters are b = c = f = g = 0, a = −11.8, d = −1.8, e = 11.8 and
h = 1.8. The memory loss is α = 0.2, the intensity of choice is β = 1 in panel (a), implying
deterministic chaotic behaviour, and β = 0.1 in panel (b), implying that in the deterministic
limit the players reach a fixed point. The two sequences are qualitatively different.
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Figure 9: (a) Time series of the moves of player Column, for stochastic learning with T = 1.
The upper (lower) panel corresponds to the stochastic learning dynamics in Fig. 8a (8b). (b)
Autocorrelation function of the moves of player Column, for both learning dynamics represented
in the left panel. If irrationality is high, the players randomize between their moves and the
autocorrelation decays instantaneously.
5.2 Belief learning
We drop the assumption of cumulative reinforcement learning (κ = 1) and we analyse other
learning algorithms in the EWA family. Looking at Eqs. (6) and (8), in order to consider
a general value for κ, it is sufficient to rescale the intensity of choice β and to replace it by
β˜ = β [1− (1− α)(1− κ)]. As the quantity multiplying β is lower than one, the intensity
of choice is smaller and so the irrationality parameter is larger. Therefore, the learning
dynamics is generally more stable, and it is easier to converge to a fixed point in the centre
of the simplex.
If κ = 0 and δ = 1 we recover most forms of belief learning (α = 1: best-response
dynamics; α = 0: fictitious play; 0 < α < 1: weighted fictitious play). The rescaled
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Figure 10: Bifurcation diagram and largest Lyapunov exponent as a function of α for stochastic
learning with T = 1. The payoff parameters are H = −11.8, K = −1.8, L = 11.8 and M = 1.8,
the intensity of choice is β = 1. Chaos survives for small values of α and we observe the
equivalence between additive and parametric noise.
intensity of choice is β˜ = βα. First of all, this means that the coordinates of the fixed points
do not depend on α any more (Eqs. (10) and (20)). However, the memory loss sets the
timescale of convergence to the fixed points, so in the limit α → 0 convergence may take
exponentially long time. Moreover, the stability threshold (19) in discoordination games
depends non-linearly on α, which does not cancel out:
βα√
2α− α2A ≤ 1. (21)
The derivative of the LHS with respect to α is positive, and so smaller and smaller values
of α make stability more and more likely. In other words, the parameter space where it is
possible to observe unstable behaviour shrinks as α is reduced. In the limit α → 0, the
LHS goes to zero, so stability is ensured for all parameter values. Note that the case α = 0,
κ = 0 is the standard fictitious play learning algorithm (see Ho et al. (2007), Fig. 1) that
was ruled out by obtaining the steady state dynamical equations (5), from the more general
EWA rule (4). However, by taking the limit α→ 0 ex-post, we recover the well known result
of Miyazawa (1961) and Monderer and Sela (1996), namely that in non-degenerate 2 × 2
games fictitious play would converge to the NE.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have exhaustively characterized the dynamics of EWA learning in generic
2 × 2 games. We have shown that a variety, or a taxonomy, of different behaviours can be
observed, according to the properties of the payoff matrix and to the value of the parameters
of the learning algorithm. The taxonomy naturally relates to classes of games that have been
extensively studied in the literature: in dominance-solvable games we observe convergence
towards the unique pure strategy NE; in coordination games we find multiple fixed points
corresponding to the NE; in discoordination games the unique mixed strategy NE may be
unstable and the learning dynamics may settle in a limit cycle or a low dimensional chaotic
attractor. However, for all classes of games, if the players cannot choose with certainty
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the best performing strategy (because of finite intensity of choice), quickly forget the past
performance of their moves and/or have little incentives in terms of payoffs, the learning
dynamics converges to a fixed point well in the centre of the simplex, where the players
simply randomize between the pure strategies.
The novelty of this work is first of all in its approach: we have identified a number of
relevant parameters and classified the learning dynamics accordingly, by ex-post relating the
values of the parameters to the classes of games described above. In particular, we have
found that irrationality, defined as the ratio of memory loss α to intensity of choice β, if
large implies the convergence to a mixed strategy in the centre of the simplex. We have
then defined a coordination parameter by computing the difference of the diagonal and the
off-diagonal elements in the payoff matrix for both players (A for row and C for column),
and multiplying the two numbers (AC). A large positive value of coordination is related to a
coordination or an anticoordination game, where the players try and coordinate on the same
profiles of pure strategies.12 If coordination is negative (A is positive and C is negative, or
viceversa), the players try and coordinate on different profiles of strategies and there is no
pure strategy NE. The payoff matrix defines a discoordination game and, for a good level
of rationality, is related to an unstable learning dynamics. The third parameter is called
dominance. It is obtained as the absolute value of the product of the difference between the
payoffs associated with one pure strategy and the payoffs associated with the other one, for
both players (B for row and D for column, so dominance is |BD|). If large, it is likely that
the payoff matrix describes a dominance-solvable game.
Thanks to the exhaustive characterization of 2× 2 games, we have found general prop-
erties about the features of the payoff matrix that relate to a convergent or non convergent
learning dynamics, without the need to assume symmetry or zero or constant sum, as most
previous works did; we have provided explicit values for the parameters which define the
onset of instability. For the first time, we have fully analysed EWA, showing that its learn-
ing properties are more general than those of the learning algorithms it generalizes. In
particular, EWA has several free parameters that can be tuned to govern the “speed” of the
learning dynamics, thereby facilitating convergence or rather unstable behaviour. Moreover,
we have found chaos in a two strategy set, showing that non periodic dynamics can occur
even in simple games.
The perspectives of this work span multiple dimensions. From the point of view of the
learning algorithms, we aim at generalizing our approach to a form of rule learning, so that
the players select the best performing learning algorithms, e.g. through evolutionary dynam-
ics. More sophisticated algorithms may involve a larger information cost, and evolutionary
dynamics may select a learning algorithm which implies convergence to the NE, or rather
another learning algorithm whereby the players quickly switch their moves as soon as there
is a better performing strategy, so that instability is more likely. It is also possible that
a fixed point in the space of learning algorithms is not reached, so that the players keep
switching their learning rule. From the point of view of the payoff matrices, it is interesting
to understand which are the features of larger strategy sets that are associated with sta-
ble or unstable dynamics and to see their relative prevalence under some properly defined
ensemble. The common feature of the classes of games with most convergence results in
the literature is that they are acyclical (Arieli and Young, 2016), so that a chain of best
responses converges to a profile of strategies (equivalently, there are no cycles in best re-
sponses). However, Foster and Young (1998) show a counterexample of a coordination game
where fictitious play does not converge, implying that some less trivial and higher-order
cyclical properties probably matter. Game theory has largely focused on classes of games
where learning converges, but whether such classes are typical has not been thoroughly ex-
plored. It is sensible that, by increasing the size of the strategy sets and/or the number of
players, unstable dynamics may become prevalent. Some work has in part confirmed this
conjecture (Sanders et al., 2016), but a more systematic investigation is required.
12In coordination games, where A and C are positive, they try and coordinate on profiles where they play the
same strategy. On the contrary, in anticoordination games, where A and C are negative, they try and coordinate
on profiles of strategies where their moves are different.
24
The ultimate goal of this line of research is to test whether learning converges in ex-
periments. Most experiments show approximate aggregate convergence, but the underlying
games have usually distinct equilibria and paths of convergent best replies. For general pay-
off matrices with cycles in best-responses and several players, the players may just endlessly
cycle between the profiles of strategies, even in reality, and equilibrium concepts would be
meaningless. For what concerns 2 × 2 games, we may test our theoretical prediction on
the unstable behaviour in discoordination games, by looking at the persistence of the ex-
perimental individual time series. A footprint of the stability of a mixed strategy fixed
point is a lack of autocorrelation between successive moves by the players, whereas cycling
behaviour is associated with a slower decay in the autocorrelation function. It is also pos-
sible to estimate the EWA parameters given the time series (Camerer and Ho, 1999), and
we could check if the learning dynamics would be in the unstable region of the parameter
space. Only experiments will be able to provide a definitive answer on the dilemma about
the convergence of learning in games.
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A Payoff parameters and classes of games
To prove Proposition 1 for the generic 2 × 2 payoff matrix (1), with 8 degrees of freedom,
is cumbersome. However, we show that there are only 4 effective degrees of freedom in the
payoff matrix, for what concerns the NE and the dynamical properties of EWA learning.
Consider the payoff matrix (1); then consider
Π′ =
(
H,L 0, 0
0, 0 K,M
)
, (22)
where H = a− c, K = d− b, L = e− g and M = h− f .
Finally, consider
Π′′ =
(
0, 0 0, L′
H ′, 0 K ′,M ′
)
, (23)
where H ′ = −H, L′ = −L, K ′ = K and M ′ = M .
Proposition A.1. (i) The payoff matrices Π and Π′, defined by (1) and (22) respectively,
have the same pure and mixed strategy NE.
(ii) The EWA dynamics (6) is identical in the two cases, and so is any learning dynamics
where the propensities are mapped to the probabilities using a logit function and the expected
payoff enters as an additive term in the update of the propensities.
(iii) Any other payoff matrix Π′′ where the elements H ′, K ′, L′ and M ′ are either
identical or opposite to H, K, L and M , and are in the same position if identical and on
the opposite position if opposite (up rather than down for Row, left rather than right for
Column) is equivalent to Π and Π′. An example of such payoff matrix is Π′′, defined in
(23).
Therefore, we set the off-diagonal elements to zero and prove Proposition 1 using payoff
matrix (22). We then prove Proposition A.1.
Proof of proposition 1. In terms of the payoff matrix (22), the parameters A, B, C and
D are defined as
A =
1
4
(H +K) ,
B =
1
4
(H −K) ,
C =
1
4
(L+M) ,
D =
1
4
(L−M) .
(24)
As we are interested in their relative magnitudes, we drop the 1/4 multiplicative factors
and write coordination and dominance respectively as
AC = (H +K) (L+M) ,
|BD| = |(H −K) (L−M)| . (25)
We start proving (i). The game is symmetric, so H = L and K = M . So |A| = |H +K|
and |B| = |H −K|. Moreover, the conditions H,K > 0 or H,K < 0 respectively describe
coordination and anticoordination games, whereas if either H or K are negative the game
is dominance-solvable. So, if H and K have the same sign, the payoff matrix describes a
coordination game and the sum of H and K (in absolute value) is larger than their difference,
so that coordination is larger than dominance; if the signs of H and K are different, the
game is dominance-solvable and the difference between H and K is larger (in absolute value)
than their sum: dominance is larger than coordination.
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We then consider (ii). If (|BD| > |AC|), either |B| > |A|, or |D| > |C|, or both.
Therefore, either H and K do not have the same sign, or L and M do not have the same
sign, or both. All of these cases represent dominance-solvable games (the profile of pure
strategies which is the NE of the game depends on the relative signs). On the contrary, the
condition |BD| < |AC| does not necessarily imply that both |B| < |A| and |D| < |C|.13
However, if that is the case, the sums of H +K and L+M are larger than the differences
H −K and L−M , which means that H,K and L,M have the same sign. If AC > 0, also
A and C have the same sign, so either H,K,L,M are all positive, or they are all negative.
If H,K,L,M > 0, the payoff matrix describes a coordination game; if H,K,L,M < 0, the
payoff matrix describes an anticoordination game. If AC < 0, A and C have different signs.
Suppose without loss of generality that A > 0, C < 0. Then H,K > 0, L,M < 0. The
payoff matrix represents a discoordination game.
We still have to show that, the larger the value of coordination (compared to domi-
nance), the more likely the payoff matrix describes a coordination or anticoordination game
(rather than a dominance-solvable game). This is not obvious. Coordination may be large
because A  B, but it could still be that C . D. An extreme example is that B = 0 (so
dominance is null), whereas A,C 6= 0: it is always |AC| > |BD| = 0, but this condition
imposes no restrictions on whether |C| > |D| or |C| < |D|. The intuition is, if we ran-
domly choose the payoff elements, it is not likely to generate such a specific payoff matrix.
We verify this conjecture by running extensive numerical simulations. For each (AC,|BD|)
point, we generate 1000 random realizations of the payoff matrix with specified AC and
|BD|; we then compute the fraction of dominance-solvable games (the other fractions are
coordination or discoordination games, according to whether we are in the positive or neg-
ative AC semiplane). The results are in Figure A.1. As expected, if |BD| > AC, all games
are dominance-solvable. Viceversa, the larger the absolute value of AC, the more likely the
payoff matrix may represent (anti)coordination or discoordination games. Interestingly, the
fraction of dominance-solvable games never drops to zero. Finally, notice the consistency
between Figure A.1 and Figure 1 (net of the fact there is not a neat separation between the
dominance-solvable and the (anti)coordination and discoordination regions).
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Figure A.1: Fraction of dominance-solvable games for randomly generated payoff matrices, as a
function of the coordination (AC) and dominance (|BD|) parameters. The larger is coordination
compared to dominance, the more likely the payoff matrix describes a coordination (if AC > 0)
or discoordination (if AC < 0) game.
13For instance, consider the payoff matrix (1), with a = 3, e = 1, d = −1, h = 2, b = c = f = g = 0:
this is a dominance-solvable game, but |AC| = 3/8 > |BD| = 2/8. Note that |D| = 1/4 < |C| = 3/4, but
|B| = 1 > |A| = 1/2
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Proof of proposition A.1. We start proving (i). The pure strategy NE are only deter-
mined by the ordinal properties of the payoffs. Consider player Row. Her contribution in
determining the pure strategy Nash Equilibria depends on whether a > c or d > b, so it
is unchanged if we consider H = a − c > 0 and K = d − b > 0. The same argument
applies to player Column: his contribution in determining the pure strategy Nash Equilibria
depends on whether e > g or h > f , so it is unchanged if we consider L = e − g > 0 and
M = h− f > 0. The same is true for all other positive/negative combinations.
In the 2×2 game described in (1), the mixed strategies NE (p, 1−p), (q, 1−q) for players
Row and Column respectively are given by
p =
h− f
e− g + h− f ,
q =
d− b
a− c+ d− b .
(26)
Again, we can rewrite the above equations without loss of generality in terms of H, K,
L and M , namely
q =
K
H +K
,
p =
M
L+M
.
(27)
We consider (ii). We only focus on player Row (the proof for Column is identical). If,
at time t, Column plays a mixed strategy given by (y(t), 1 − y(t)), the expected payoff for
Row for playing pure strategy 1 is ΠR1 (y(t)) = ay(t) + b(1 − y(t)) and the expected payoff
for strategy 2 is ΠR2 (y(t)) = cy(t) + d(1 − y(t)). Now, the ratio x(t+1)1−x(t+1) fully determines
x(t+ 1). Using (6) we find
x(t+ 1)
1− x(t+ 1) ∝ e
β(1−(1−α)(1−κ))
(
ΠR1 (y(t))−ΠR2 (y(t))
)
, (28)
where ΠR1 (y(t)) − ΠR2 (y(t)) = (a − c)y(t) + (d − b)(1 − y(t)) = Hy(t) + Ky(t). Note that
the same argument applies for any other learning algorithm where the expected payoffs are
in the argument of an exponential and can be separated from the past propensities (e.g. do
not enter multiplicatively).
Finally, (iii) follows simply from the above results. If we consider H ′ = −H at the
bottom left in the payoff matrix, it is H ′ = c− a, so a > c implies that H ′ < 0 (the payoff
element at the top left is still larger than that at the bottom left), the mixed strategies are
identical upon the transformation H ↔ −H ′ and the learning dynamics depends on H as
well, as ΠR1 (y(t))−ΠR2 (y(t)) ∝ (0−H ′)y(t) = Hy(t).
Apart from the above properties, we stress that the transformed payoff matrix (22) is
not fully equivalent to (1). For instance, consider the following Prisoner Dilemma (PD):
ΠPD =
(
2, 2 0, 3
3, 0 1, 1
)
, (29)
where strategy 1 is Cooperate and strategy 2 is Defect. The transformed payoff matrix is
Π′PD =
( −1,−1 0, 0
0, 0 1, 1
)
. (30)
The payoff matrices (30) and (29) are not equivalent, in that the property that the
NE and the Pareto Equilibrium do not coincide is lost, and so is the dilemma between
cooperation and defection.
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In a similar manner, consider the Stag-Hunt (SH) game:
ΠSH =
(
2, 2 0, 1
1, 0 1, 1
)
, (31)
where strategy 1 is Stag (S) and strategy 2 is Hare (H). Here (S,S) is the payoff-dominant
NE, while (H,H) is the risk-dominant NE. If we apply the transformation we find
Π′SH =
(
1, 1 0, 0
0, 0 1, 1
)
. (32)
The above is a pure coordination game, and the properties of payoff and risk-dominance
no longer hold.
However, note that both in (29) and (30) and in (31) and (32) the NE are the same
and so are all differences in payoffs, holding the strategy of the other player fixed. A
learning algorithm that bases its learning properties on the performance of one pure strategy
compared to the other one, should be invariant under the payoff matrix transformation which
we described: this is probably the most intuitive explanation of why Proposition 1 holds.
B Proof of Proposition 2
We first consider assertion (i). Since B = 0, there is always a fixed point x˜? = 0. It is stable
if (from Eq. (13))
β
α
|A| ≤ 1. (33)
So, as long as x˜? = 0 is the unique fixed point, it is stable.
We then consider assertion (ii), and in particular the lower bound, βα |A| → 1+. There are
two fixed points x˜? = ±, where  is an arbitrarily small number. Thanks to the symmetry
of the game, we focus on a profile of mixed strategies given by (x˜?, x˜?). To second order,
cosh x˜? ≈ 1 + (x˜?)2 /2. The stability condition becomes
α
β
(
1 +
(x˜?)
2
2
)(
1 +
(x˜?)
2
2
)
− |A| ≥ 0, (34)
i.e.
(x˜?)
2 ≥ β
α
|A| − 1. (35)
Now, we Taylor expand Ψ(x˜?) (defined in Section 4.1.1) to third order (first order would
just yield x˜? = 0) and solve x˜? = Ψ(x˜?). Apart from the null solution, we get
(x˜?)
2
=
3
(
β2A2
α2 − 1
)
β2A2
α2
(
1 + β
2A2
α2
) . (36)
It is easily checked that for βα |A| → 1+, the condition (35) is satisfied: the fixed points
whose components are the “lateral solutions” are stable. Therefore, there is a supercritical
pitchfork bifurcation at the value βα |A| = 1.
The upped bound, namely βα |A| → ∞, is easily dealt with. Indeed, because we are
searching for the intersection with the x˜? line, the fixed point is approximately the height
of the hyperbolic tangent itself: x˜? ≈ ±βα |A|. Now, for βα |A| → ∞ the hyperbolic cosine
can be approximated by
cosh
(
β
α
|A|
)
≈ exp
(
β
α
|A|
)
/2. (37)
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We can rewrite the stability condition as:
4β
α
|A| exp
(
−2β
α
|A|
)
≤ 1. (38)
For βα |A| → ∞, the LHS of the above equation goes to zero, so the inequality obviously
holds.
Finally, the proof of (iii) is identical to the proof of the upper bound for βα |A|, in that
the same arguments apply to sufficiently large values of βα |B|, for which the only fixed point
will be far enough from zero to be stable.
C Proof of Proposition 3
In order to study the properties of the pure strategy NE we need to consider the learning
dynamics in the original coordinates (the pure strategies map into infinite elements in the
transformed coordinates). The EWA dynamics reads (using (6) and the payoff matrix (1)):
x(t+ 1) =
x(t)1−αeβ(ay(t)+b(1−y(t))
x(t)1−αeβ(ay(t)+b(1−y(t)) + (1− x(t))1−αeβ(cy(t)+d(1−y(t)) ,
y(t+ 1) =
y(t)1−αeβ(ex(t)+f(1−x(t))
y(t)1−αeβ(ex(t)+f(1−x(t)) + (1− y(t))1−αeβ(gx(t)+h(1−x(t)) .
(39)
From Eq. (39) we can see that the pure strategies (x, y) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} are
all fixed points of the dynamics. Let us study their stability properties. We get a Jacobian
J =
(
J11 J12
J21 J22
)
, (40)
with
J11 =
(1− α)(x− x2)αeβ(y(a−b−c+d)+b−d)(
x(1− x)αeβ(y(a−b−c+d)+b−d) − (x− 1)xα)2 ,
J12 =
β(x− x2)α+1(a− b− c+ d)eβ(y(a−b−c+d)+b−d)(
x(1− x)αeβ(y(a−b−c+d)+b−d) − (x− 1)xα)2 ,
J21 =
β(y − y2)α+1(e− f − g + h)eβ(x(e−f−g+h)+f−h)(
y(1− y)αeβ(x(e−f−g+h)+f−h) − (y − 1)yα)2 ,
J22 =
(1− α)(y − y2)αeβ(x(e−f−g+h)+f−h)(
y(1− y)αeβ(x(e−f−g+h)+f−h) − (y − 1)yα)2 .
(41)
As it can be seen by taking the appropriate limits in Eqs. (41), for all pure strategies
the Jacobian has infinite elements along the main diagonal and null elements along the
antidiagonal. This means that the NE in pure strategies are infinitely unstable, and may
be the reason for the extreme nonlinearities observed in Galla and Farmer (2013) near the
faces of the simplex.
The only case where the elements of the Jacobian for the NE in pure strategies would
not be infinite is that of no memory loss, α = 0, as it is possible to see if one computes the
eigenvalues with this parameter restriction. In fact, the NE in pure strategies become stable
fixed points of the learning dynamics.
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D Effect of stochasticity on learning
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Figure D.1: Time series of the probabilities x (in blue) and y (in red). Values of the parameters:
α = 0.3, b = c = f = g = 0, a = e = 2, d = h = −1, β = 0.5 in (a)-(d), β = 0.1 in (e)-(f).
(a) Deterministic learning; (b) Stochastic learning with T = 2; (c) Stochastic learning with
T = 1 and δ = 1; (d) Stochastic learning with T = 1 and δ = 0; (e) Deterministic learning;
(f) Stochastic learning with T = 1 and δ = 1. Deterministic and stochastic learning are largely
similar. See Section 5.1 for further comments.
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Figure D.2: Time series of the probabilities x (in blue) and y (in red). Values of the parameters:
α = 0.1, β = 1, b = c = f = g = 0, a = e = 6, d = h = 1. (a) Deterministic learning starting
from the initial conditions x(0) = 0.1 and y(0) = 0.05, close to the Pareto-dominated NE; (b)
Deterministic learning starting from the initial conditions x(0) = 0.3 and y(0) = 0.4, farther to
the Pareto-dominated NE; (c)-(d) Single realizations of stochastic learning, starting from the
same initial condition as (a). Noise can help reaching the most efficient fixed point only in the
early stage of the dynamics. See Section 5.1 for further comments.
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Figure D.3: Bifurcation diagram and largest Lyapunov exponent as a function of α for several
values of T . The payoff parameters are b = c = f = g = 0, a = −11.8, d = −1.8, e = 11.8 and
h = 1.8 and the intensity of choice is β = 1. Panels (a)-(b): T = 10; Panels (c)-(d): T = 100;
Panels (e)-(f): T = 1000. The stronger the level of noise, the more blurred are the dynamical
properties. See Section 5.1 for further comments.
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